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One of the most important tasks of urban and hazard planning is to mitigate the damages
and minimize the costs of the recovery process after catastrophic events. The rapidity
and the efficiency of the recovery process are commonly referred to as resilience. Despite
the problem of resilience quantification has received a lot of attention, a mathematical
definition of the resilience of an urban community, which takes into account the social
aspects of a urban environment, has not yet been identified. In this paper we provide
and test a methodology for the assessment of urban resilience to catastrophic events
which aims at bridging the gap between the engineering and the ecosystem approaches
to resilience. We propose to model a urban system by means of different hybrid social-
physical complex networks, obtained by enriching the urban street network with addi-
tional information about the social and physical constituents of a city, namely citizens,
residential buildings and services. Then, we introduce a class of efficiency measures on
these hybrid networks, inspired by the definition of global efficiency given in complex
network theory, and we show that these measures can be effectively used to quantify
the resilience of a urban system, by comparing their respective values before and af-
ter a catastrophic event and during the reconstruction process. As a case study, we
consider simulated earthquakes in the city of Acerra, Italy, and we use these efficiency
measures to compare the ability of different reconstruction strategies in restoring the
original performance of the urban system.
Keywords: resilience, risk, street networks, complex networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Today more than 50% of humans around the world
live in urbanised areas (UN, 2010) and this percentage
is expected to increase by 2050 up to 86% in developed
countries and up to 64% in developing countries (UN,
2008). Consequently, the estimation of the resilience of
urban systems against natural and human-induced risks,
together with the implementation of successful strategies
aiming at resilience strengthening and risk mitigation,
represents a urgent challenge for the scientific commu-
nity, with potential impact on billions of human lives.
Cities are among the most complicated and beautiful
human artefacts, being the result of the intricate interac-
tion of several constraints and processes which determine,
reshape and refine the urban structure at all scales. One
of the most relevant of such constraints is geographical:
cities are embedded in a geometrical space, and their
structure and development is heavily and undoubtedly
affected —and to some extent driven— by the morphol-
ogy of the surrounding environment. Then, there is a
technological component, consisting of all the buildings
and services provided by the city itself, together with the
infrastructures that physically link them together: as a
matter of fact, urban areas have become more attrac-
tive than rural settlements only because they guarantee
a faster and more efficient access to a wider set of facil-
ities, services and opportunities. Finally, and more im-
portantly, there is the human aspect, i.e. all the citizens
that reside, move and work within this physical frame,
together with all the social, economical, cultural and his-
torical processes that contribute to the evolution of an
urban area over the centuries. Taking into account all
these factors, we easily realise that a city can be effec-
tively considered a complex system, i.e., according to one
of the most general definition available, a system consist-
ing of many interacting units with the ability to generate
a non-trivial, collective behaviour through the combina-
tion of simple mechanisms acting at a local scale (Bar-
Yam, 2003).
In the last few decades there has been an increas-
ing interest for the quantitative study of urban systems
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2from a complex systems perspective, and several methods
and metrics have been proposed to measure the struc-
tural properties of cities and to quantify their evolu-
tion over time (Wilson, 1970; Batty and Longley, 1994;
Batty, 2007; Makse et al., 1995; Salingaros, 2005; Mar-
shall, 2004; Bettencourt et al., 2007), with particular at-
tention to the study of street patterns and transportation
networks (Cardillo et al., 2006; Crucitti et al., 2006; Scel-
lato et al., 2006; Bettencourt and West, 2010; Porta et al.,
2011; Strano et al., 2012).
Despite recent literature has pointed out the necessity
to introduce ad-hoc metrics to quantify the resilience of
a city against shocks (Dalziell and McManus, 2004), to
date a unique and universally accepted definition of ur-
ban resilience is still missing. So far, the efforts to pro-
vide an operational measure to assess resilience of urban
systems against shocks and disasters have been inspired
by two main philosophies, namely the engineering vision
and the ecosystem vision, which are fundamentally differ-
ent in the spirit and, to some extent, diverging (Lorenz,
2010).
In the engineering vision, the resilience of a city or a
metropolitan area depends on the capability of all the
physical components of the system, including buildings
and transportation infrastructures, to absorb the dam-
ages due to an external shock and to quickly restore their
state before the shock (O’Rourke, 2007; Reed et al., 2009;
Bruneau et al., 2003; Pimm, 1984; Opricovic and Tzeng,
2002).
In the ecosystem approach, instead, resilience is de-
fined as the capability of the whole urban system to re-
cover the full set of functionalities and services that ex-
isted before the shock, even without returning exactly
to the state before the shock (Holling, 1973, 1986, 2001;
Holling and Gunderson, 2002; Folke, 2006; Kovalenko and
Sornette, 2013). This implies that, due to the restoration
of the infrastructures and services damaged by the shock,
the city might evolve in something slightly different from
what it was before, while keeping its identity in a broader
sense. On the one hand, the engineering approach explic-
itly requires that each single component of the system,
due to the restoration process, reaches a new state in
which its performance is not worse than one it had before
the shock occurred. On the other hand, the ecosystem
approach to resilience provides a more general framework
to understand the recovery of complex systems (Holling,
1996). However, this approach requires that the metrics
employed to quantify resilience should be able to cap-
ture the performance of the system as a whole, which is
usually much more than the algebraic sum of the per-
formances of its single components. Determining which
of the two approaches is more appropriate for the quan-
tification of urban resilience is still a matter of active
debate.
In this paper we engage with this debate by presenting
a consistent framework for the quantification of urban
systems resilience, which interpolates between the engi-
neering and the ecosystem approach, allowing a quanti-
tative estimation of system resilience while focusing, at
the same time, on the performance of the urban system
as a whole. This framework is based on the represen-
tation of cities as complex networks. In particular, we
make use of Hybrid Social-Physical Networks (HSPNs),
which provide a compact representation of the geograph-
ical, technological and social aspects of a city. Then, we
propose a set of network efficiency indexes to quantify
the performance of a HSPNs. We show that the dam-
age inflicted to a city by a shock can be easily quantified
as the ratio between the efficiency of the corresponding
HSPNs after and before the shock. Similarly, the effec-
tiveness of different reconstruction strategies is compared
by computing the evolution of the network efficiency of
the HSPNs obtained using each strategy.
As a case study we considered the city of Acerra
(Italy). We first constructed three HSPNs of Acerra
in the pre-shock configuration. Then, we quantified the
damage inflicted to the original networks by simulating
earthquakes of increasing intensity. Finally, we compared
the performance of six different reconstruction strategies
in restoring the original HSPN efficiency. The results
suggest that the weakness of the urban ecosystem of Ac-
erra is due to an high-risk historical centre and that re-
construction strategies which allocate a large portion of
displaced people in few distant points can not completely
restore the pre-shock efficiency.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section II we
briefly discuss the state of the art about urban resilience
quantification, focusing on the theoretical contributions
to the field recently provided by researchers in complexity
and network science. In Section III we define three Hy-
brid Social-Physical Networks associated to a city and we
propose a set of efficiency metrics to quantify their per-
formance. In Section IV we define a measure to assess the
resilience of a urban system based on the efficiency of the
associated HSPNs, and we review a few reconstruction
strategies typically employed in the aftermath of a disas-
ter. In Section V we report the results of the proposed
methodology on a case study, based on the simulation of
earthquakes of increasing intensity in the city of Acerra
(Italy), and we discuss the ability of different reconstruc-
tion strategies to recover the original performance of the
city. Finally, in Section VI we report a discussion of the
results and suggest some potential future extensions of
this work.
II. MOTIVATION AND RELATED WORKS
The resilience of infrastructure and transportation sys-
tems against natural and human-induced disasters has
been largely investigated in the literature and several
methods to quantify resilience have been proposed, anal-
3ysed and discussed. A comprehensive review of the sub-
ject is beyond the scope of the present work. However,
we believe that some recent contributions have proposed
interesting concepts which could be potentially employed
to quantify the resilience of urban systems. For instance,
Reed et al. (2009) proposed a method to characterize
the behavior of networked infrastructures prone to natu-
ral hazards, considering the interdependency of the sys-
tem, with applications on power and telecommunication
networks. Ouyang et al. (2012) proposed a multi-stage
framework to analyse power transmission grids resilience
and have identified, for each stage, a series of resilience-
based improvement strategies. Maliszewski and Perrings
(2012) hypothesized that the resilience of power distri-
bution systems depends on two main factors, i.e., the en-
vironment where the network operates, and the priority
policy employed during restoration. Attoh-Okine et al.
(2009) proposed a resilience index for urban infrastruc-
tures based on the Belief Function framework, while Li
and Lence (2007) introduced a resilience index defined as
the ratio between the failure probability and the recovery
probability. Omer et al. (2009) focused on the resilience
of telecommunication cable systems, defining it as the ra-
tio between the amount of information transmitted after
a disruption and the amount carried before the shock oc-
curred. The reliability of infrastructure networks prone
to natural hazards has been largely discussed in (Pinto
et al., 2006), and several different methods based on con-
nectivity and flow were recently analysed (Li and He,
2002; Duen˜as Osorio and Rojo, 2011; Cavalieri et al.,
2012; Franchin and Cavalieri, 2013a).
In a recent paper, Tamvakis and Xenidis (2013) pro-
vided a comparative review of several methods for re-
silience quantification, pointing out that most of the ex-
isting approaches might actually have quite limited appli-
cability, due to the fact that these methods usually rely
on some ad-hoc assumptions and often focus on specific
subsystems, like telecommunication or power distribution
networks. As a result, although some of the concepts and
methodologies are interesting and potentially powerful,
they cannot be straightforwardly extended to quantify
the resilience of a urban system as a whole, which nor-
mally consist of several interconnected and interdepen-
dent subsystems.
In the last decade or so, important contributions to
the problem of measuring the robustness of a system
and quantifying its resilience to attacks and failures have
come from the analytical study of complex networks.
Complex network theory has proven to be a robust the-
oretical framework to study the topology of networked
systems and has largely been employed for the character-
ization of a variety of phenomena occurring in systems
composed by interconnected units, including many bio-
logical, technological and social networks (Strogatz, 2001;
Newman, 2003; Boccaletti et al., 2006). Recently, com-
plex network theory has also been successfully employed
to quantify and model the topological aspects of spatial
networks in general (Barthe´lemy, 2011) and of street net-
works in particular (Crucitti et al., 2006; Strano et al.,
2012). The complex network approach to resilience is
based on the analysis of an extremely simplified model
—a graph—, representing the elementary components of
the the original system and the relations among them.
The main assumption is that such a network model, de-
spite discarding some specific details, is nevertheless able
to capture the fundamental properties of the original
system. This approach has been successfully employed
to study the robustness and resilience of complex trans-
portation networks, information networks and power dis-
tribution systems (Albert et al., 2000; Callaway et al.,
2000; Cohen et al., 2000; Paul et al., 2004) and has re-
cently been extended to the case of multi-layer and inter-
dependent networks (Berche et al., 2009; Buldyrev et al.,
2010; Satumtira and Duen˜as Osorio, 2010; Vespignani,
2010; Gao et al., 2011a,b; Huang et al., 2013).
As a matter of fact, the functioning of the infrastruc-
tures and services of a urban area heavily rely on the ex-
istence of an underlying road network, and the efficiency
of a city as a whole undoubtedly depends on the topolog-
ical properties of its street pattern. In this respect, the
street network is one of the most important aspects of a
city, since its structure is intimately connected with the
reachability of services and facilities and therefore with
the overall quality of life perceived by the citizens. The
quantitative analysis of urban street networks has shown
that their topologies have complex structural proper-
ties (Cardillo et al., 2006; Scellato et al., 2006; Porta
et al., 2011; Barthe´lemy, 2011), and recent works seem
to confirm that the street network plays a central role
in shaping the evolution of an urban area (Batty, 2007;
Marshall, 2004; Bettencourt et al., 2007; Strano et al.,
2012; Southworth and Ben-Joseph, 2003). Consequently,
it would be tempting to define the resilience of a urban
system in terms of the resilience of its street network.
However, a urban system is indeed the result of the
intricate combination of several technological and social
processes, and all its richness and complexity cannot be
fully captured by the analysis of the underlying street
network alone. A meaningful assessment of urban re-
silience to shocks should be focused on the real impact of
the shock on the efficiency of a urban system as perceived
by the citizens, and should therefore take into account
other factors that concur to the perceived post-shock lack
of performance, including population density, location of
facilities, services availability and relocation strategies.
In the next Section we introduce a simplified represen-
tation of urban systems based on hybrid complex net-
works, which provides a consistent framework to inte-
grate the structure of the urban street network and in-
formation about inhabitants, buildings and services.
4III. MODELLING URBAN SYSTEMS BY MEANS OF
HYBRID SOCIAL-PHYSICAL NETWORKS
The methodology for the assessment of urban resilience
to shocks that we present here aims at bridging the gap
between the engineering and the ecosystem approach to
resilience. On the one hand, we identify a set of mea-
sures which allow to quantify, from an engineering point
of view, the ability of a urban system to return to its pre-
shock performance after a disaster. On the other hand,
in the same spirit of the ecosystem vision, our measures
are able to quantify the resilience of urban system even
when, due to the post-shock restoration process, the ur-
ban system has attained a different configuration.
Here we first review some standard metrics for complex
street networks analysis, and we then introduce Hybrid
Social-Physical networks, together with metrics to quan-
tify their overall efficiency.
A. Networks of urban street patterns
Generally, networks can conveniently be described by
means of graphs consisting of a set of points N , called
nodes or vertices, and by a set V of edges connect-
ing pairs of points. A graph with N = |N | nodes
(N = {n1, n2, n3, . . . nN}) and K = |V| edges (V =
{v1, v2, v3, . . . vk}) can be represented by giving its ad-
jacency matrix, i.e. the N ×N matrix A = {aij} whose
entry aij is equal to 1 if there is an edge connecting node i
and node j, while aij = 0 otherwise. It is also possible to
assign a weight or a length lij to each edge linking nodes
i and j in a graph, thus defining a weighted adjacency
matrix {lij}.
Spatial networks are a special class of complex net-
works whose nodes are embedded in a space associated
with a metric. Typical examples of spatial networks
include electric power grids (Kinney et al., 2005) and
transportation systems including rivers, trade routes and
street networks (Crucitti et al., 2006; Strano et al., 2012;
Pitts, 1965). In the case of street networks, each cross-
ing is represented by a node while edges represent street
segments, so that two nodes are connected by an edge
if the corresponding crossings are adjacent to the same
segment of road. Given a city, in the following we denote
by G(N ,V) the graph representing the urban street pat-
tern, where N is set of street junctions and V is the set
of street segments. Street networks are naturally embed-
ded in a two-dimensional Euclidean space, whose metric
is the usual Euclidean distance, so that the lengths lij
of the edges satisfy the triangular equality (Barthe´lemy,
2011).
In transportation and communication networks it is
usually important to know how to move or send an in-
formation from a node i to another node j. An alternate
sequence of nodes and edges that starts from i and ends
in j is called a walk from i to j. If there exists a walk
between node i and node j, we say that i and j are con-
nected. A maximal set of nodes which are mutually con-
nected to each other is called a component of the graph.
If not all the pairs of nodes in the graph are connected,
then the graph is composed by more than one component.
Each walk is associated to a cost, that is the sum of the
lengths of the edges involved in the walk. If each node of
the walk is traversed only once, then the walk is called
a path. The path from i to j having minimal length is
called shortest path and its length is denoted by dij . If
two nodes are not linked by any walk, then dij is set to
∞, and the two nodes are said to be disconnected.
A measure of the typical separation between nodes in
the graph is the characteristic path length L, that is the
mean value of the length of the shortest paths between
all the possible pairs of nodes:
L =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i,j∈N ,i6=j
dij . (1)
In general, the lower the characteristic path length, the
better the communication between any pair of nodes cho-
sen at random. Using the characteristic path length to
measure the resilience of a city is possible but indeed not
convenient, since L becomes infinite as soon as there ex-
ists at least one pair of disconnected nodes. However,
the result of a shock event on a city, like an earthquake
or a flood, is often a disconnected street network, which
always has an infinite characteristic path length indepen-
dently of the actual number of pairs of sites that remain
disconnected after the event. The network efficiency, pro-
posed in reference (Latora and Marchiori, 2001), is a
measure which allows to overcome the subtleties due to
infinite characteristic path lengths and can be therefore
used to quantify the average reachability of the nodes
even when the network is not connected, e.g. in the case
of partially disrupted road networks after a disaster. The
efficiency eij of the communication between nodes i and
j in a generic graph is defined as the inverse of the length
of the shortest path connecting i to j, i.e. eij = 1/dij .
The efficiency is minimal and equal to 0 when i and j are
disconnected, i.e. when dij = ∞. In the case of spatial
graphs, the efficiency of a pair of nodes is usually nor-
malized dividing it by the Euclidean distance between
the two nodes, so that the efficiency between i and j is
defined as eij = d
eucl
ij /dij , where d
eucl
ij is the Euclidean
distance between node i and node j. Notice that the re-
sulting normalized efficiency is maximal and equal to 1 if
and only if the shortest path between i and j runs exactly
along the direction of the geodesic which connects them.
The global efficiency of a spatial network is defined as
the average of the normalized pairwise efficiency over all
possible pairs of nodes (Vragovic´ et al., 2005):
E =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i,j∈N ,i6=j
deuclij
dij
. (2)
5Notice that the global efficiency is normalized in [0, 1],
since in general the distance dij between node i and node
j, which is measured as the total length to be traversed
in order to get from i to j using a sequence of street
segments, is larger than the Euclidean distance between
i and j, so that each term in the summation is ≤ 1.
Consequently, it is possible to compare in a consistent
way the efficiencies of two distinct graphs G and G′, even
if they have a different number of nodes and edges.
B. Construction of Hybrid Social-Physical Networks
The street network of a city is the main physical com-
ponent of the hybrid network description of urban sys-
tems that we propose. In order to take into account
some of the social aspects of a city, we enrich the road
network adding different kinds of nodes, which represent
citizens, buildings and facilities, and different kinds of
links, which model the relationships between social and
physical elements. We call the resulting graph a Hybrid
Social-Physical Network (HSPN). The idea of modelling
cities by constructing augmented graph models which in-
tegrate information about their main components has re-
cently been employed in the field of resilience assessment
(see for instance Cavalieri et al. (2012); Franchin and
Cavalieri (2013a)).
According to the nature and accuracy of the informa-
tion used to augment the road network, we can actually
obtain several different HSPN representations of a urban
system. A first example is the residential HSPN, which
includes information about population and building loca-
tions and is constructed as follows. For each building we
add a new building node, whose coordinates are those of
the centroid of the building footprint on the map. Then,
each building node is connected to the road network by
means of a new doorstep edge orthogonal to the street
segment closest to the building. The other endpoint of
a doorstep edge, called a doorstep node, is chosen to be
either one of the existing crossings in the street network
or a newly ad-hoc added node 1.
The construction of the residential network is illus-
trated in Figure 1.In this case the HSPN consists of two
sets of nodes and two set of edges, namely
• The set of intersection nodes, which we called N .
• The set of building nodes, hereafter referred as B.
• The set of street segments, which we called V.
1 The choice of doorstep nodes was made by hand in order to
guarantee, at the same time, that the direction of doorstep edges
remains as close as possible to the direction orthogonal to the
closest street segment and that only a small number of extra
nodes were actually added to the existing road network.
Social link
Citizens
Door link
Building or street intersection
Street link
FIG. 1: Network representation of a city. Each building
is associated to a new node and is connected to the road
networks by means of a doorstep edge incident on a
doorstep node. Also, each citizen living in a building is
represented as a virtual (green) node attached to the
building. The distance between two citizens living in
buildings incident on the same doorstep node is set to
zero.
• The set of doorstep edges, denoted by VB
With a little abuse of notation, we include in the set N
the doorstep nodes, besides some of them were not ini-
tially present in the road network and have been added
to the street network just to attach doorstep edges. The
street network augmented with the set of building nodes
and doorstep edges is denoted by GB(N ∪ B,V ∪ VB). In
order to correctly take into account the mutual reach-
ability of citizens, each building is also attached to a
set of citizen nodes. These are just virtual nodes intro-
duced to model the relationships between citizens and
the buildings in which they live. By definition, the dis-
tance between two citizen nodes is equal to the distance,
on the road network, between the doorstep nodes of the
buildings in which they live. Consequently, if two citi-
zen nodes are attached to the same building or to two
separate buildings incident on the same doorstep node
then their distance is set to zero. This is clarified by
Figure 1. Both the social and the physical part of the
HSPN can be even more complex, and a procedure sim-
ilar to that used to construct residential HSPNs can
be employed to augment the street network with addi-
tional information. For instance, if we consider the street
network together with residential and commercial build-
ings, we can assess the capability of citizens to reach
goods supplies. The corresponding graph is denoted by
GG(N ∪ B ∪ G,V ∪ VB ∪ VG), where G is the set of nodes
representing commercial buildings and VG is the set of
logical links connecting this commercial buildings with
the adjacents street segments. We call this graph a goods
HSPN. In order to quantify its relative importance, we
associate to each goods building i a weight Gi which is
6proportional to the amount of goods it makes available
to citizens.
Similarly, we can also construct a service HSPN to
assess the capability of citizens to access public ser-
vices, like schools, hospitals and other public infras-
tructures. In this case the HSPN is denoted by
GS(N ∪ B ∪ S,V ∪ VB ∪ VS), where S is the set of nodes
representing public buildings and VS is the set of logical
links connecting public buildings to intersection nodes.
As in the case of goods HSPN, the relative importance of
a service i in terms of quantity and/or quality of service
provided to citizens is encoded in a weight Si.
We notice that this methodology allows to construct
many other HSPNs corresponding to different lifelines.
For instance, information about the electric grid network
and the water supply/sewerage network can be included
in the model, to investigate the capability of the urban
system to provide citizens with electricity and water, re-
spectively.
The potential of this approach lays in the fact that the
global performance of the HSPN associated to a given
service can be considered as a proxy of the accessibility
of that service by the citizens, i.e. as a measure of the
quality of the service provided. Thus, it is possible to
quantify and compare the performance of the HSPN in
distinct configurations of the physical networks, even if
some infrastructures are not present in one of the configu-
rations. By performing this analysis before and after the
reconstruction which follows an hazardous event, which
damages some of the pre-existent physical components
of the urban system, we can quantify how the quality of
public services provided to citizens has been affected, al-
though the physical systems are rebuilt and rearranged
in a new configuration. Thus, we believe that the HSPN
approach is an effective methodology to provide a quanti-
tative assessment of the resilience of a urban system —as
requested by the engineering approach— based on a sys-
temic perspective that properly takes into account the
social aspects of the system and the perceived efficiency
of the city as a whole —as indicated by the ecosystem
approach.
C. Efficiency of Hybrid Social-Physical Networks
We define here some efficiency metrics for HSPNs
which are inspired by the normalized global network effi-
ciency given in equation (2). The mere definition (2) is
inadequate to estimate the efficiency of the city, because
it does not take into account the number of people liv-
ing in each building. We can then devise a measure of
efficiency of communications between people inside build-
ings by summing over all couples of inhabitants and using
deuclij /dij = 1 for couples of inhabitants living at distance
zero, i.e. assuming the maximum efficiency in their com-
munications. In the same spirit of Equation (2), we define
the efficiency of a residential HSPN as :
Ecc =
1
Htot(Htot − 1)
∑
i∈B
Hi
(Hi − 1) + ∑
j∈B,j 6=i
Hj
deuclij
dij

=
1
Htot(Htot − 1)
∑
i∈B
Hi
(hi − 1) + ∑
j∈(B\I)
Hj
deuclij
dij
 ,
(3)
where i, j are the indexes of nodes representing buildings,
Htot is the total number of inhabitants of the city, Hi is
the number of people living in building i, B is the set
of nodes representing buildings, dij is the length of the
shortest path between i and j evaluated on graph GB
and hi is the number of inhabitants that live in the set
I of buildings with zero distance to building i2. This
definition of efficiency for a residential HSPN, is indeed
able to quantify the mutual reachability of people living
in the city. In fact, the lower the distance among people
in the augmented network, the higher the efficiency value
of the corresponding HSPN, and vice-versa. Notice that
in the summation over j, j 6= i we set deuclij /dij = 1 for
couples of buildings at zero distance. The term (Hi −
1) inside the parentheses, multiplied by Hi, takes into
account the couples of inhabitants that live in the same
building and whose efficiency is eii = 1.
It is possible to define an efficiency also for goods
HSPNs, by substituting the outer summation in Equa-
tion (3) with a summation over the set G of the buildings
that contain goods, e.g. shops and retail stores, and di-
viding by the quantity Gtot which is equal to the sum of
the importance of all goods buildings. In formula:
Ecg =
1
GtotHtot
∑
i∈G
∑
j∈B
GiHj
deuclij
dij
=
1
GtotHtot
∑
i∈G
Gi
hi + ∑
j∈(B\I)
Hj
deuclij
dij
 , (4)
where Gi is an estimate of the amount of goods in the
shop i ∈ G, dij is the length of the shortest path be-
tween i and j evaluated on the graph GG . Notice that
Equation (4) measures the average of the inverse of the
normalized distance between people and goods sold in
shops, and effectively quantifies how easily citizens can
access goods supplies.
Similarly, the efficiency of the service HSPN is given
2 Notice that the distance between two buildings is set to zero if
their corresponding doorstep edges incide on the same doorstep
node
7by the equation:
Ecs =
1
StotHtot
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈B
SiHj
deuclij
dij
=
1
StotHtot
∑
i∈S
Si
hi + ∑
j∈(B\I)
Hj
deuclij
dij
 , (5)
which is just the average of the inverse of the normalized
distances between people and services. In this case, Si
represents a measure of the importance of the service i
(e.g. the floor area of the building or the totol number
of citizens that can potentially use the service), S is the
set of nodes representing service buildings and Stot =∑
i Si. In this equation the length dij of a shortest path
is evaluated on the graph GS .
IV. USING HSPNS TO QUANTIFY URBAN RESILIENCE
The main idea in this paper is to use the efficiency
measures on HSPNs to quantify the resilience of a ur-
ban system, by comparing their respective values before
and after a catastrophic event and during the subsequent
restoration. In this section we first report the classi-
cal definition of resilience and introduce an ad-hoc nor-
malization. We then review six reconstruction strategies
which permit to simulate and trace the restoration pro-
cess.
A. Measures of resilience
The classical approach to urban resilience is based on
the definition of a recovery function Y (t), whose value
at time t is equal to the measured performance of the
system at that time. If the recovery process starts at
time t1 and is completed at time t2, then the resilience
R of the urban system is defined as the area under the
recovery curve (Reed et al., 2009):3
R =
∫ t2
t1
Y (t)dt
t2 − t1 . (6)
Notice that R depends both on the time required by
the recovery process and on the reconstruction strategy
adopted. By using the HSPN model of a city, it is possible
to define the performance of the urban system at time t
as the ratio between the efficiency E(t) of the associated
HSPN at time t and the efficiency E0 of the HSPN just
before the disaster occurred, namely
Y (t) = E(t)/E0 (7)
3 Some authors refer to the resilience as the area over the recovery
function (Bruneau et al., 2003)
This definition of performance requires to know the struc-
ture of the HSPN at each time during reconstruction.
However, this information depends on several factors in-
cluding the available budget and the promptness of the
reconstruction, and is usually not easy to obtain. Con-
sequently, we remove any explicit dependence of the re-
silience on time, and use a recovery function Y (C) =
E(C)/E0 defined as the ratio between the efficiency E(C)
of the urban system when C citizens have been relocated
and the efficiency E0 immediately after the disaster. In
particular, we make use of the normalised performance:
y(C) =
Y (C)− Y (0)
1− Y (0) . (8)
Notice that y(C) = 0 in the aftermath of the disaster,
i.e. when y(C) = 1 when Y (C) = 1. In order to quantify
the resilience of a urban system we define the measure:
R =
∫ Cmax
0
y(C)dC
Cmax
, (9)
where Cmax is the total number of people to be relocated
after a certain event. In the following we employ Equa-
tion (9) instead of the classical definition of resilience
given in Equation (6), as it permits to appreciate the re-
covery of a city closely after the disaster and to compare
different strategies of reconstruction after events of differ-
ent magnitude. To date, a discussion about a proper way
to compute a normalized resilience is ongoing (Franchin
and Cavalieri, 2013b).
B. Reconstruction strategies
We review here the six reconstruction strategies con-
sidered in the case study reported in Section V.
The first strategy, referred to as status quo down-up,
aims at re-obtaining exactly the same configuration of
buildings and services that the city had before the catas-
trophic event occurred. The reconstruction process is dis-
cretized into n steps. In each step a fraction 1/n of the
displaced citizens (those living in the damaged buildings)
is reallocated, assuming that the buildings are restored
starting from the smallest ones and proceeding towards
the largest ones, i.e. from the cheapest to the most ex-
pensive. Blocked roads are recovered when the buildings
that caused their interruption are made safe or recon-
structed. In the second strategy, referred to as status
quo up-down, the city eventually returns to the undam-
aged configuration, as in the status quo down-up, but the
restoration process starts with the largest buildings and
proceeds towards the smallest ones.
The third strategy, hereafter referred to as new sites
down-up, consists in reallocating part of the displaced
citizens in new residential sites. Also this process is dis-
cretized into steps. In the first step some new buildings
8are constructed in 4 empty areas (highlighted in figure 9),
to reallocate 20% of the displaced citizens. Then the ex-
isting buildings are restored as in the first strategy, from
the smallest to the largest ones, until all citizens have
been reallocated. Notice that in the new sites down-up
strategy some of the existing buildings are not ever re-
covered, since part of the population is reallocated in the
newly constructed buildings. To re-establish the origi-
nal urban street pattern, it has been assumed that the
interrupted roads, that would have not been recovered
(since interrupted by buildings that are not recovered),
are re-established during the last step. The fourth strat-
egy, called new sites up-down, is similar to the new sites
down-up one, but, after reallocating the first 20% of cit-
izens in the newly constructed buildings, the restoration
of damaged buildings proceeds from the largest to the
smallest ones. The new sites strategies are adopted in
real cases to recover basic urban functionalities as fast as
possible, and have been recently employed in the after-
math of earthquakes, e.g. in the case of L’Aquila 2009
earthquake, in Italy (Cosenza and Manfredi, 2010).
The fifth strategy, called status quo inwards, consists
in rebuilding the city as in its undamaged configuration,
moving from the suburbs to the centre. Finally, the sta-
tus quo outwards is similar to status quo inwards but
the reconstruction starts from the centre of the city and
proceeds toward the suburbs.
V. A CASE STUDY: THE CITY OF ACERRA
As a case study to test our methodology for resilience
quantification we considered a urban area —the city of
Acerra, in Italy— and we simulated several earthquake
scenarios, evaluating the damage caused by each earth-
quake and the ability of different reconstruction strate-
gies in restoring the pristine performance of the urban
system, measured in terms of the efficiency of the corre-
sponding residential, goods and services HSPN.
Acerra is a medium-sized city in the Province of
Naples, in Italy, about 20km north-east of Naples (Fig-
ure 2); its foundation dates back to as early as 400 BC,
which makes it one of the oldest cities in that region.
The urban configuration, typical of many other medium-
sized cities in Italy, is characterised by a dense historical
centre, where most of the buildings are ancient masonry
buildings, surrounded by more recent urban expansion
areas, mainly consisting of reinforced concrete buildings;
the built-up area is surrounded by a countryside area,
where a large industrial settlement is also located. The
whole territory extends over a surface of about 54km2
and its population is estimated in about 55.000 inhabi-
tants. Acerra is prone to seismic risk, due to its close-
ness to the seismogenic areas of the Appennines, which
are just about one hundred kilometres away from the city
center. Figure 3 reports the seismic hazard in terms of
FIG. 2: Acerra location.
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FIG. 3: Seismic hazard: annual rate of eartquakes
exceeding a certain value of PGA as a function of PGA.
annual rate of occurrence of events with a Peak Ground
Acceleration (PGA) larger than a certain value. Further-
more, the city is exposed to flood risk, due to the Regi
Lagni river which borders the built-up area, and to indus-
trial risk, due to the infrastructures and factories located
in the industrial area around Acerra. In the following we
will focus on seismic risk alone.
9A. Numerical simulations
In order to study the resilience of Acerra, we extracted
detailed information about the street network organisa-
tion, location of buildings and building typology. Then,
we constructed three different HSPNs (namely, a resi-
dential HSPN, a goods HSPN and a service HSPN where
the set of services was restricted to schools), and we sim-
ulated earthquake scenarios corresponding to increasing
PGA values. By integrating this information with an ad-
hoc fragility model, we simulated building failures due
to each earthquake and then we analysed the subsequent
reconstruction process, by comparing the performance of
six different reconstruction strategies. We provide here
the details of the simulations, and we discuss afterwards
the results.
Data acquisition. We used GIS software to collect and
integrate information about the street network and the
location and typology of buildings in Acerra. We divided
buildings into structural typologies and we measured the
total floor area of each typology, which was lately used
to estimate the number of citizens living in each residen-
tial building and the relative importance of retail shops
and services. In Figure 4 we show the street network of
Acerra, in which the positions of buildings are reported
as black squares.
Fragility model. We employed an ad-hoc model to esti-
mate the probability that each building will be damaged
by an earthquake of a certain intensity and the proba-
bility that a damaged building would also interrupt the
transit along the streets to which it is adjacent. Con-
cerning building damage, we modelled the probability
that the building would exceed the “onset of damage”
(and thus would be considered unfit for occupation or
use) due to an earthquake of PGA equal to x through a
log-normal distribution function:
Pb (x;µ, σ) = Φ
(
− lnx− µ
σ
)
. (10)
The parameters (µ, σ) have been set equal to
(−1.03, 0.35) for masonry buildings and equal to
(−0.91, 0.29) for reinforced concrete buildings, accord-
ing to reference (Ahmad et al., 2011). Notice that the
adopted fragility model does not consider building height
as a parameter and does not take into account failure cor-
relation.
If a building is over the onset of damage, then its failure
could also make inaccessible the streets adjacent to it,
either because of building debris fallen on the road or
because of access restrictions imposed for safety reasons.
This road interruption probability is defined as:
Pr (h, l) =
{
1 if h ≥ l,
h
l otherwise,
, (11)
where h is the height of the building and l is the width
of the road. Notice that the higher the building and the
narrower an adjacent road, the higher the probability for
that road to be made inaccessible if the building is over
the onset of damage. If a street segment is inaccessi-
ble, it is removed from the street network. In general,
the removal of street segments has negative effects on
the overall reachability of the street network (and of the
HSPN obtained from the same network), and could also
cause the fragmentation of the street network into several
isolated components, separated from each other.
HSPN parameters. The definitions of efficiency for
rsidential, goods and service HSPNs given in Equa-
tions (3), (4) and (5), depend on the quantification of
the number of citizens living in each residential building
(Hi and hi) and of the relative importance of stores (Gi)
and service buildings (Si). The number of inhabitants
of residential buildings was estimated by considering the
average density of inhabitants per square meter, obtained
by dividing the total number of citizens in Acerra (i.e.,
55.000) by the total number of square meters in residen-
tial buildings. This yields a value of one inhabitant per 30
square meters. Concerning the goods HSPN, we consid-
ered the total area of each store as a proxy of its impor-
tance. Finally, we considered services HSPN restricted
to schools and students, and we considered the total area
of a school as a proxy for its relative importance Si.
Earthquake simulation. We employed Monte Carlo
techniques to simulate several earthquakes scenarios cor-
responding to increasing PGA values. In each scenario,
we computed the probability for each building of be-
ing beyond the onset of damage (according to Equa-
tion (10)), and the corresponding probability for roads
to be made inaccessible by damaged buildings (accord-
ing to Equation (11)). This resulted, for each realisation,
in a certain number of citizens to be relocated because
of the damage inflicted by the earthquake to residential
buildings, and to a set of street segments to be removed
from the road network and from the HSPNs since they
were made unusable by damaged buildings, respectively.
For each simulated scenario we constructed the corre-
sponding residential, goods and schools HSPNs, and we
evaluated the damage inflicted to the urban system as
the difference between the efficiency of the HSPN before
the simulated earthquake and the efficiency of HSPNs
right after the earthquake occurred.
Recovery simulation. For each earthquake scenario,
we simulated the six different reconstruction strategies
detailed in Section IV.B. During reconstruction, build-
ings were progressively put back in place, citizens were re-
located and damaged street segments restored. We used
Equation (8) as a recovery function and Equation (9)
to compare the recovery of the urban system due to the
implementation of different strategies.
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FIG. 4: Buildings (black points) and street patterns (bold lines) network for the city of Acerra.
B. Results
We considered several earthquake scenarios, corre-
sponding to PGA values in the range [0.05g, 1.0g], and we
evaluated three sets of measures for each scenario, com-
paring their values with the undamaged configuration.
In particular, we computed:
1. The number of undamaged buildings and the num-
ber of not displaced people as a function of PGA,
whose values are reported in figure 5 .
2. The values of Ecc, Ecg and Ecs corresponding, re-
spectively, to residential, goods and schools HSPN.
The results are reported in Figure 6.
3. Several metrics to quantify the performance of the
damaged street network, including the number of
connected components, the number S of nodes in
the largest component and the characteristic path
length L of the largest connected component. The
results are reported in Fig. 7.
Notice that all the results shown in Fig. 5, 6 and 7
are normalised with respect to the initial (undamaged)
configuration. The absolute values corresponding to the
initial configuration are reported in Table I.
Figure 5 suggests that the number of undamaged build-
ings and the number of not displaced people have the
same exponential decay with PGA, and that the corre-
sponding exponent value is b ' −4. This high correlation
between undamaged buildings and not displaced people is
mostly due to the fact that we assumed a constant value
for the number of inhabitants per square meter. Also, we
could have expected a different decay exponent if we had
considered that people could have also been displaced
from undamaged buildings, e.g. because of unavailability
of basic support services (Cavalieri et al., 2012). We ob-
serve a faster exponential decay, with exponent b ' −9,
TABLE I: Characteristics of the undamaged
configuration.
Ecc 0.746
Ecg 0.252
Ecs 0.313
undamaged buildings 3493
not displaced citizens 55000
Number of connected components 1
Characteristic path length (m) L(0) = 1798
Nodes belonging to the largest component S(0) = 4638
for Ecc, Ecg and Ecs for values of PGA between 0.25g
and 0.6g, as shown in Figure 6. These results confirm
that the efficiency of HSPNs can be reliably used as a
proxy of the quality of a urban system.
Furthermore, from Figure 7 we note that the behaviour
of the street network is consistent with a percolation tran-
sition, indicating the existence of a critical PGA range
around 0.25g beyond which the street network is broken
into many parts and does not exhibit a giant connected
component any more (Stauffer and Aharony, 1994; Doro-
govtsev et al., 2001). This is due to the fragility functions
adopted to simulate building damage, which have a sig-
nificant increase in the collapse probability for values of
PGA in the range [0.20g, 0.30g]. It is also evident from
Figure 7 that the relative characteristic path length has
a peak corresponding to PGA=0.25g. We believe that
this abrupt increase is due to the failure of most short-
cut roads. Although we cannot claim that the critical
PGA value for the percolation transition is exactly at
PGA= 0.25 (a correct estimation of this threshold would
require more fine-grained calculations), we notice that
such a value of PGA would most probably damage the
majority of the masonry buildings, which are placed in
11
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FIG. 5: The number of undamaged buildings and the
total number of not displaced citizens as a function of
PGA. Notice that both quantities decrease
exponentiallyu with PGA, with an exponent b ' 4.
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original efficiency in the pre-shock networks as a
function of PGA.
the center of Acerra, and would consequently fragment
the city into a large number of small connected compo-
nents. Therefore, it is actually the high density of ma-
sonry buildings located in the city center which causes
the sudden fragmentation of the street network.
For the comparative analysis of the six reconstruc-
tion strategies we considered only three values of PGA,
namely 0.2g, 0.25g and 0.3g, which are consistent with
the most likely eartquake intensity in the region of Ac-
erra4. In Figure 8 we report a typical configuration of the
simulated damaged network for each of the three values
4 According to Figure 3, values of PGA larger than 0.3 are very
unlikely to occur.
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FIG. 7: Street network fragmentation under earthquake
event. The number of connected components (solid
line), the normalized characteristic path length of the
largest component L(PGA)/L(0) (dotted line), the
normalized size of the largest component S(PGA)/S(0)
(dashed line), and the normalized efficiency eq. (2) of
the graph G(N ,V) (dash-dotted line) are plotted as
function of increasing intensity of earthquake, measured
in unit of PGA.
of PGA. During recovery, we measured the performance
of the urban system by means of the efficiency of the
HSPN. The typical plots of Ecc, Ecg and Ecs of one real-
isation corresponding to each value of PGA are reported
in Figure 10, 11 and 12.
The values 〈R〉, averaged over several realisations of
the three PGA scenarios, are reported in Table II, along
with the corresponding standard deviations σR. The ta-
ble suggests some remarks about the ability of different
reconstruction strategies to recover the pristine urban ef-
ficiency. First of all we observe that the new sites strate-
gies provide quite slow efficiency recovery, if compared
with the status quo strategies. In particular, in the new
sites strategies after the first step, consisting in the real-
location of the 20% of the inhabitants into new buildings
(the location of the four areas chosen for the simulated
construction of those four new buildings are shown in
Figure 9), the efficiency values always show a negligible
increase. Furthermore, at the last step the efficiency val-
ues are not totally recovered to their initial values. This
means that the new configuration of the city, with 4 new
buildings used to reallocate the 20% of the displaced citi-
zens, is less efficient than its original configuration. Also,
it was not possible to detect any sensible difference be-
tween new sites up-down and new sites down-up.
We notice that for earthquakes of PGA= 0.2g and
PGA= 0.25g, the status quo strategies (and in particular
the status quo inward) guarantee the fastest recovery of
Ecc among all the reconstruction strategies considered.
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(a) (b)
(c)
FIG. 8: Configuration of the simulated damaged physical network after simulated earthquake scenarios of PGA 0.2g
(a), 0.2g(b) and 0.3g(c).
This result can be explained by the fact that, in this par-
ticular case study, the masonry buildings, which are the
most vulnerable to earthquakes, are mostly placed in the
centre of the city. Hence, in the post-earthquake con-
figuration the center of the city will remain much more
disconnected, and in fact it is characterised by a consid-
erably large “hole” at the center of the HSPN networks
(as shown for instance in Figure 8). Thus, in the status
quo outwards strategy the first steps are not so efficient
since the building are restored onto a seriously damaged
network. Conversely, in the status quo inwards strategy,
the restored buildings are progressively reinstalled onto a
network which is also progressively reconnected, making
this strategy more resilient.
We would like to stress that the evaluation of the sta-
tus quo inwards strategy is of particular interest. In fact,
in many old cities the center consists mainly of ancient
masonry structural aggregates, and its reconstruction is
particularly costly, both for technical issues and for con-
servation constraints. For these reasons, reconstruction
of damaged historical cities is often more rapid in the
suburbs than in the center.
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TABLE II: Values of R of the different reconstruction
sttrategies, computed using definition (9) and averaged
across several realisations. For each HSPN and each
value of PGA, the ∗ indicates the most resilient
reconstruction strategy, while the rows checked with †
and ‡ correspond to the two less resilient strategies.
HSPN PGA(g) reconstruction strategy 〈R〉 σR
cc 0.2 status quo outwards 0.47391 0.08879
* cc 0.2 status quo inwards 0.55236 0.09428
† cc 0.2 new sites up-down 0.36180 0.09964
‡ cc 0.2 new sites down-up 0.38107 0.08869
cc 0.2 status quo up-down 0.49051 0.08001
cc 0.2 status quo down-up 0.53831 0.08035
cc 0.25 status quo outwards 0.42057 0.08230
* cc 0.25 status quo inwards 0.56707 0.08151
‡ cc 0.25 new sites up-down 0.33861 0.08539
† cc 0.25 new sites down-up 0.29228 0.09030
cc 0.25 status quo up-down 0.48078 0.09865
cc 0.25 status quo down-up 0.49351 0.08014
cc 0.3 status quo outwards 0.43396 0.08190
cc 0.3 status quo inwards 0.41964 0.08441
‡ cc 0.3 new sites up-down 0.28566 0.09984
† cc 0.3 new sites down-up 0.27392 0.09762
cc 0.3 status quo up-down 0.45144 0.08706
* cc 0.3 status quo down-up 0.45853 0.09530
cg 0.2 status quo outwards 0.49691 0.08089
cg 0.2 status quo inwards 0.52764 0.09833
‡ cg 0.2 new sites up-down 0.48297 0.08193
† cg 0.2 new sites down-up 0.26874 0.08987
*cg 0.2 status quo up-down 0.63748 0.09920
cg 0.2 status quo down-up 0.40420 0.09003
cg 0.25 status quo outwards 0.41859 0.08798
* cg 0.25 status quo inwards 0.57646 0.08102
‡ cg 0.25 new sites up-down 0.36596 0.08714
† cg 0.25 new sites down-up 0.24454 0.08885
cg 0.25 status quo up-down 0.53955 0.08797
cg 0.25 status quo down-up 0.43379 0.09598
cg 0.3 status quo outwards 0.44838 0.08595
cg 0.3 status quo inwards 0.43294 0.08732
‡ cg 0.3 new sites up-down 0.32794 0.08493
† cg 0.3 new sites down-up 0.18873 0.08525
* cg 0.3 status quo up-down 0.51809 0.09438
cg 0.3 status quo down-up 0.36390 0.09503
cs 0.2 status quo outwards 0.48476 0.08221
cs 0.2 status quo inwards 0.56003 0.09898
‡ cs 0.2 new sites up-down 0.47966 0.08680
† cs 0.2 new sites down-up 0.31011 0.09207
* cs 0.2 status quo up-down 0.61563 0.08768
cs 0.2 status quo down-up 0.42986 0.09178
cs 0.25 status quo outwards 0.45244 0.09527
cs 0.25 status quo inwards 0.49339 0.09459
‡ cs 0.25 new sites up-down 0.34012 0.08884
† cs 0.25 new sites down-up 0.21159 0.09018
* cs 0.25 status quo up-down 0.49917 0.09161
cs 0.25 status quo down-up 0.43433 0.08902
* cs 0.3 status quo outwards 0.50632 0.08900
cs 0.3 status quo inwards 0.41086 0.09551
† cs 0.3 new sites up-down 0.27636 0.08425
‡ cs 0.3 new sites down-up 0.30121 0.08320
cs 0.3 status quo up-down 0.44357 0.08407
cs 0.3 status quo down-up 0.46652 0.08789
FIG. 9: The position of the new residential areas
(circles) chosen for the new sites recovery strategies.
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FIG. 10: The value of the efficiency Ecc(C) of the
residential HSPN as a function of the number of
relocated people C for the 6 recovery strategies in the
0.2g PGA(a), 0.25g PGA (b) and 0.3g PGA(c)
earthquake scenarios. Each panel shows the absolute
values of efficiency divided by the corresponding
pre-shock efficiency Ecc(0).
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FIG. 11: Values of Ecg(C) for the 6 recovery strategies
in the 0.2g PGA(a), 0.25g PGA (b) and 0.3g PGA(c)
earthquake scenarios, as a function of C. As for
Figure 10, each panel reports the value of Ecg at a
certain reconstruction strategy divided by the efficiency
of the original urban configuration.
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FIG. 12: Ecs as a function of C for the 6 recovery
strategies in the 0.2g PGA(a), 0.25g PGA (b) and 0.3g
PGA(c) earthquake scenarios. The absolute values are
normalized with the pre-shock efficiency Ecs(0)
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed a novel methodology to
quantify the resilience of complex social-physical urban
systems against disasters. This methodology aims to
bridge the gap between the two classical approaches to
resilience: the engineering resilience, generally meant as
the capability of a system to recover its initial configura-
tion after a shock, and the ecosystem resilience, generally
meant as the capability of a system to recover its func-
tionality even by reaching a new configuration. The pro-
cedure presented here is inspired by the idea that city re-
silience should properly take into account its social com-
ponents, namely the citizens, which are the final users of
the urban system as a whole. Our approach to quantify
city resilience is based on the efficiency of hybrid net-
works composed by citizens and urban infrastructures.
In order to assess the capability of a city to recover
its functionality after a shock event, we compared the
efficiency of the corresponding hybrid networks before
and after the shock event has occurred and, as a case
study, we considered the city of Acerra, for which we
simulated several earthquake scenarios and analysed res-
idential, goods and schools hybrid social-physical net-
works. We also compared the ability of six different re-
construction strategies, which differ from each other for
the assignment of reconstruction priorities, in restoring
the pristine performance of the urban system.
While the main idea of the proposed methodology is to
assess the resilience of urban recovery, the quantification
of the efficiency of hybrid networks can be employed also
for other purposes, e.g. to compare the efficiency of dif-
ferent urban configurations or different urban planning
strategies (this would be a urban planning task), or to
design the reconstruction operations after an hazardous
event. Thanks to our approach, the best reconstruction
strategy can be selected by identifying the physical con-
figuration which maximises the performances of all the
hybrid networks.
According to our metrics, the best strategy classes with
respect to residential reallocation are the down-up and
inwards. In fact these strategies provide a faster response
in the immediate aftermath, securing and restoring many
buildings in the first reconstruction step. In particular
the status-quo strategies ensure the total recovery up to
the original HSPN efficiency. The others strategies, al-
locating many citizens in a few distant new areas pro-
duce longer average distance between people and, conse-
quently, a lower HSPN efficiency. We can then infer that
a good reconstruction strategy should take care first of
the restoration of the bulk of a city. The analysis of the
street network fragmentation also underlines the weak-
ness of the urban ecosystem of Acerra, in which the over-
all connectivity of the HSPNs heavily depends on the
connectivity of a high-risk historical centre, consisting of
ancient masonry buildings which are indeed more prone
to seismic risk.
We would like to stress that these results are strongly
related with the specific city configuration under study,
and that extra care should be taken while trying to gen-
eralize these results to other specific cases. We also no-
tice that the methodology we proposed in this work to
quantify resilience is based only on the number of real-
located citizens, and does not account for the availabil-
ity of financial resources, restoration rates or restoration
prioritization, also considering emergency management
issues. We believe that an estimation of resilience based
on the actual restoration time, i.e. on the total time
needed to restore the damaged buildings and to reallo-
cate all the citizens, would be possible by introducing
in the model additional information about financial re-
sources and restoration rates. We also notice that the
availability of financial resources and the prioritization
strategies resulting from emergency management issues
are indeed a social-economic background input, not de-
pending on the adopted recovery strategy.
Once the financial aspect is introduced in the model,
the methodology could also be enriched and refined by
considering the different restoration costs associated to
different building typologies. As a matter of fact, is esti-
mated that the cost of rehabilitating masonry buildings
in the historical centre, in Italy, is twice as larger than
the cost of rebuilding reinforced concrete structures in
a similar damage state, while the construction time in
the first case is also significantly higher than in the sec-
ond. This difference in restoration costs would affect the
performance of the outwards strategies that start by re-
habilitating the historical centre, and would therefore be
substantially less effective than the inwards strategies.
This observation could become even more important in
the case of large scale disasters, where such strategies
would require to invest a large amount of resources in
the immediate aftermath of the disaster.
Further research activities on this topic are currently
ongoing. In particular, a research direction of interest
is the quantification of the impact of disasters on inter-
connected networks, by using some recent theoretical re-
sults about the fragility of complex interdependent net-
works (Cohen et al., 2000; Paul et al., 2004; Buldyrev
et al., 2010; Gao et al., 2011a; Cohen et al., 2001). An-
other possible direction to explore is the usage of multi-
plex and multi-layer networks, which have been recently
proposed as a valuable tool to model systems which con-
sist of several different and intrinsically interdependent
systems (Morris and Barthelemy, 2012; Brummitt et al.,
2012).
The authors are currently working to enrich and cali-
brate the measures defined in this paper in order to pro-
pose a consistent set of quantifiable efficiency measures to
estimate the quality of life perceived by the inhabitants
of a urban systems, which could be used also to measure
the resilience of cities in an ecosystemic and social-centric
17
perspective.
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